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Does Property Rights Protection Affect Corporate Risk Management Strategy?
Intra- and Cross-Country Evidence

1. Introduction
Property rights are a fundamental concept in the economics and finance literature. As
Levine (p.61, 2005) points out, “the security of property rights . . . is not a natural occurrence;
rather it is an outcome of policy choices and social institutions.” Recent studies show that
good legal environments that provide strong property rights protection and contract
enforcement reduce cost of capital, enhance corporate governance, firm valuation,
reinvestment rates, assets allocation, corporate innovation, firm growth and thereby economic
growth (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Beck et al., 2003; Beck et
al., 2005; Besley, 1995; Chen et al., 2009; Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cull and Xu, 2005;
Johnson et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1998, 2002; Lin et al., 2010; Shleifer and Wolfenzon,
2002). Using a unique large corporate property insurance dataset covering more than 55,000
manufacturing firms in China and following the framework of Cull and Xu (2005) and
Levine (2005), we add to this line of research by empirically testing the effect of property
rights security on corporate risk management – an important element of a firm’s overall
business strategy (Guay and Kothari, 2003, p.423) but has been generally neglected so far in
the law and finance literature. Bankruptcy is one of the major risks facing businesses and
their investors and hence corporate risk management is of paramount importance in
preventing financial distress and bankruptcy.
The study also adds to the existing literature of corporate risk management. The extant
literature strives to explain why firms undertake risk management activities since risk
management should be irrelevant in a classic Modigliani and Miller (M&M) world without
market imperfections. In the real world with market imperfections, scholars have identified
several important determinants of corporate risk management activities such as the expected
cost of financial distress (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985), tax
incentives (e.g., Frestad, 2010; Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985),
underinvestment and predation risk (e.g., Froot et al., 1993; Haushalter, 2000), and
2

managerial risk aversion (e.g. Smith and Stulz, 1985). Our study adds to this strand of
literature by showing, for the first time, that property rights security is a new important
determinant of corporate risk management decisions. By doing so, it also contributes to the
broader corporate hedging and risk management literature, which examines the causes and
consequences of various hedging mechanisms such as financial derivatives and corporate
cash holdings (e.g., Fauver and Naranjo, 2010; Kuersten and Linde, 2011; Kusnadi and Wei,
2011).
Due to scarcity of data on corporate use of insurance, the corporate risk management
literature normally takes the use of derivatives as a proxy for corporate hedging.1 The
existing corporate risk management literature assumes that firms use derivatives purely for
hedging purposes (Guay and Kothari, 2003). However, managers may also engage in
selective hedging or speculation with derivatives though this is rarely successful. Géczy et al.
(2007) report that investors often are unable to discern the activities of frequent speculators
based on corporate disclosures. Unlike derivatives, insurance cannot be used for speculation
and therefore it provides a cleaner testing ground for the relation between property rights
security and corporate risk management (Adams et al., 2008; Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008).
As pointed out by MacMinn and Garven (2000), insurance represents a simple and widely
used corporate risk management tool and the corporate property-casualty insurance (P/C
insurance) premiums typically exceed dividend payments by an order of 30-40%. In 2004,
property-casualty insurance premiums amounted to US$1,395 billion globally. Indeed,
Mayers and Smith (1982) and Smith (1986) conclude that insurance is an integral part of
corporate financial policies. As such, evidence on the linkage between property rights
security and corporate insurance is of significant managerial and policymaking implications.
1

Corporate disclosure requirement has made derivative use data readily available in many countries, whereas
there is no similar requirement concerning the purchase of insurance. While numerous studies have empirically
examined the determinants of derivative use, investigations of corporate risk management via insurance
purchases have been relatively sparse. Only several studies (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1990; Hoyt and Khang,
2000; Zou and Adams, 2006; Regan and Hur, 2007; Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008) have examined the
determinants of corporate insurance. These studies typically use a sample of several hundred listed firms and
invariably focus on firm characteristics in explaining the corporate purchase of insurance. None of them has
focused on the importance of property rights security. In contrast, our study uses a sample of about 56,000 firms
and examines the roles of both firm-specific characteristics and external institutional factors (e.g., property
rights protection, legal and financing environment, economic development) in corporate insurance decisions.
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There is a close theoretical linkage between corporate risk management via insurance
purchases and property rights security. Corporate insurance is a contractual transfer of risks
where the insurer agrees to reimburse the insured firm losses arising from specified
accidental events (e.g., a fire). Property rights protection provides firms with the right to own
assets, to benefit from the income generated from those assets, to dispose of the assets, and to
seek compensation for any damages to such assets caused by third parties. The value of the
insurance contract thus hinges on the degree of property rights protection afforded by legal
rules and contract enforcement. Moreover, secure property rights lead to more corporate
investments and thereby better growth opportunities (Besley, 1995; Cull and Xu, 2005) and
this further provides a rationale for corporate risk management (e.g., via insurance) in order
to mitigate the underinvestment problem (Froot et al., 1993). The important linkage between
property rights security and insurance purchase, however, has rarely been tested, due to the
paucity of corporate insurance data. Using a country-level dataset, Esho et al. (2004) is the
only study that shows a positive relation between a country’s protection of property rights and
its aggregate property-casualty insurance consumption. Our study is the first to examine the
relation between variations in property rights security and the purchase of insurance at the
firm-level. This is important as Beck et al. (2006) argue that one needs to control for
firm-specific characteristics to draw appropriate inferences about the relationship between
institutions and firm behavior (e.g., risk management in our case).
China represents a unique environment within which to investigate the relation between
property rights and corporate insurance because of the following salient features. First,
property insurance is a common and major commercial risk management tool for companies
in China because of the general lack of risk management expertise among Chinese firms
and/or the relatively low safety standard.2 By purchasing an insurance policy, the insured
firm not only obtains loss coverage but also the insurer’s services on loss prevention and
control. According to Swiss Re (2004), property-casualty insurance premiums in China
amounted to US$16.77 billion in 2004, with roughly 65% derived from corporate purchases.
2

Property insurance covers accidental asset losses and is normally valid for one year and renewable upon
mutual agreements between the insured and the insurer. The purchase of property insurance in China is
voluntary (Zou and Adams, 2006).
4

Second, while extant risk management studies typically examine either corporate use of
derivatives or insurance in managing risks, we recognize that firms may manage overall risks
in a coordinated way with more than one commercial tool (e.g., both insurance and
derivatives uses). Failure to take account of the interaction among different risk management
tools may lead to a biased inference on the effect of using a particular tool (Allayannis and
Weston, 2001). This possibility, however, is minimized in China because China does not
have developed financial derivatives markets. Therefore, in this regard, China represents a
cleaner setting for our investigation.
Third, more importantly, information on corporate purchase of property insurance is a
standard expenditure item in the internal accounting books of China’s manufacturing firms
and was disclosed via the First Economic Census conducted in 2005. Such information is
thus highly reliable and not subject to the biases associated with subjective survey data
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). The unique Chinese insurance data thus provide a unique
opportunity to explore the effects of property rights security on corporate risk management
via insurance use. Fourth, China is a large and diverse country with substantial disparity in
the levels of economic and institutional development (including contract enforcement,
investor protection and the effectiveness and efficiency of the judicial system) across
different regions. Our data show significant variations in the incidence and extent of
corporate insurance among firms in different regions. In addition, Cull and Xu (2005) argue
that one important aspect of property rights is corporate ownership. China is rich in various
types of corporate ownership (e.g., state, private, and foreign ownership). In contrast to the
radical corporate ownership privatization in Russia and Eastern Europe, China’s reform of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been piecemeal and, as a result, the state still retains
controlling interest in many firms, particularly in industries of strategic importance (e.g.,
resources) (Firth et al., 2011). Another element of the corporate reform in China is to allow
and to encourage the development of private economy, particularly in industries subject to
fierce market competition (Cull and Xu, 2005). These private firms are truly market-oriented
entities responsible for their own performance and tend to be more efficient than SOEs. Allen
et al. (2005) report that private firms in China now dominate SOEs both in terms of the
5

contribution to the national economy and growth rates. The rich variety of corporate
ownership in China thus enables us to examine how state-owned and private firms that have
different levels of property rights security are different in their risk management strategy.3
Finally, corporate risk management theories posit a close linkage between debt financing,
investment and insurance (Campello et al., 2011). Insurance as a post-loss financing
mechanism can help coordinate a firm’s financing and investment decisions (Froot et al.,
1993; Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1987). For example, the existence of an appropriate insurance
program can provide cash flow hedging and help minimize the chance that investment in
positive net-present-value (NPV) projects would have to be forgone or scaled down following
a major accidental asset loss. Chinese firms (particularly unlisted firms) rely heavily on
indirect debt financing (e.g., bank loans) as equity and bond issues are tightly regulated in
China (Zou and Adams, 2008). While the state-dominated banking sector directs a
disproportionate amount of bank loans to SOEs, Allen et al. (2005) find that bank loan also
represents an important (and relatively low-cost) source of financing to private firms,
particularly during the start-up period. They also report that the deals between banks and
private firms are often of arm’s length (e.g., in terms of collateral requirement). Zou and
Adams (2008) report that (listed) firms often take out property insurance in order to secure
bank loans and/or to lower the cost of borrowing in China. Therefore, debt financing and
property insurance on collateral and other physical assets is likely to be a strategic issue in
management decision-making for both SOEs and private firms in China.
Following the recent literature (e.g., Cull and Xu, 2005; Johnson et al., 2002; Levine, 2005)
on the role of property rights security on corporate financial decisions, we measure property
3

While prior studies (e.g., Zou and Adams, 2006) also examine corporate purchase of insurance in China, our
study differs from theirs in three important ways. First, we focus on the effect of property rights security in our
paper that is not examined in their study. Second, their study relies on a small data set hand collected from
annual reports in which the disclosure of insurance information is voluntary. As a result, their study suffers from
a sample selectivity bias. In contrast, our study leverages a much larger data set that is sourced from the
mandatory regulatory filing to the State Statistical Bureau in which insurance spending is a must-to-disclose
item. Their sample also only includes publicly listed companies (the majority of which are state-controlled and
hence their samples lack variations in state ownership), whereas our sample comprises a good mix of private
firms and (unlisted) state-owned firms. Third, about 85% of the sample firms in Zou and Adams (2008) carry
property insurance, as opposed to about 40% in our sample. Therefore, our sample provides more variations in
insurance and ownership and this enables us to have a more powerful and comprehensive test of the impacts of
ownership – an important measure of property rights security – on corporate purchase of insurance.
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rights security at both the institution- and firm-levels, and by different proxies. Levine (2005)
summarizes the security of property rights into two important dimensions: 1) an active
government that enforces property rights, facilitates private contracting, and applies laws and
rules fairly to everyone; 2) a government that sufficiently constrains itself from expropriation.
We measure the former dimension by a regional property rights protection index developed
by the World Bank based on an economy-wide firm-level survey on investment climate and
competitiveness in China (hereafter as the “World Bank Survey 2006”). 4 This index
measures the likelihood that the (local) legal system will uphold business contracts and
property rights in business disputes in 2004, and is constructed separately for 120 major cities
in China. Given the unbalanced economic developments across regions in China, this index
exhibits significant variations across the cities in our sample. 5 In addition to contract
enforcement and protection, Levine (2005) further posits that the operation and development
of financial markets facilitates investor and creditor protection and therefore directly reflects
the effectiveness of property rights protection. We thus adopt a 2003 NERI (National
Economic Research Institute of China) provincial banking-sector marketization index
(reported in Fan et al. (2006)) as another proxy.6 Where the extent of marketization in the
banking sector is high, property rights are more likely to be respected and safeguarded.
Specifically, banks have more incentives to ask for collateral and property insurance to retain
the value of collateral in granting loans.
We use a 2003 NERI provincial index on reducing non-tax levies and charges (Fan et al.,
2006) as an inverse proxy for government expropriation risk in China. Non-tax levies and
charges arbitrarily imposed by various government departments are common ways of
government expropriation and/or rent-seeking by corrupt officials and can lower the security
of property rights. In addition, we use the city-level index of bank lending corruption index
4

The World Bank Survey was carried out in 2005 and measured the data for 2004. The survey results were

published in2006.
The property rights protection index and other survey indexes are associated with measurable outcomes in
terms of efficiency of investment flows, firm growth, institutions, corruption, as shown in several recent studies
(e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Beck et al., 2005; Cull and Xu, 2005; Djankov et al., 2003; Johnson et al.
2002).
6
The National Economic Research Institute (affiliated with the China Reform Foundation) compiles the widely
used marketization index for China’s 31 provinces and regions every year since 2001 (Fan et al., 2006).
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(from the World Bank Survey 2006) to measure the expropriation risk and rent seeking by
corrupt bank officials. The index measures the level of expected informal payments firms
have to pay in order to obtain bank loans in 2004. If corruption in the financing environment
is pervasive, property rights and measures to safeguard property rights (e.g., insurance of
collateral in bank loans) could be neglected in credit rationing and allocation. Therefore,
corruption in lending can be viewed as an integral part of property rights measures, which has
been shown to be of importance to external financing and firm growth (Beck et al., 2005;
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).
Moreover, following Cull and Xu (2005) we measure the security of property rights
at the firm level as different types of corporate ownership – state-owned vs. private firms.
State ownership is particularly prevalent in China while private ownership is playing an
increasingly important role in the national economy. State ownership is often associated with
vaguely defined property rights, a greater chance of political intervention, and the pursuit of
non-economic objectives at the expense of other shareholders and thus implies a low level of
property rights security. We therefore hypothesize that SOEs that are associated with a lower
level of property rights security have a lower demand for property insurance, other things
being equal.
Our tests of the relation between property rights security and corporate purchase of
property insurance suggest that: a) firms located in regions with a higher property rights
protection index, a lower government expropriation risk, and/or a more market-oriented
banking sector are more likely to insure their assets and purchase more insurance; b) a higher
proportion of state (private) ownership tends to be associated with a lower (higher) incidence
and extent of insurance use; and c) in areas with relatively poor property rights protection,
corruption in bank lending seems to have a negative effect on corporate demand for insurance.
Our tests also suggest that the strength of the property rights protection afforded by the local
legal system seems to have a first-order effect on corporate demand for property insurance,
while the effects of other institution- and firm-level property rights proxies are conditional on
a region’s overall protection of property rights. One may argue that in addition to the lower
level of property rights security in SOEs, the potential access to state contingent financing by
8

SOEs may also lead to a lower demand for property insurance. However, when we repeat our
analysis using only private firms that should not have access to state contingent financing and
so presumably are a cleaner sample than SOEs, our results regarding institution-level
property rights protection remain robust.
To generalize our findings and examine the issue in a broader context, we examine the
property rights – insurance link in an international context using country-level data from 93
countries over the period 1995-2008. Our cross-country analysis using aggregate insurance
spending suggests a strong and positive association between property rights protection and
the purchase of P/C insurance. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that the
degree of property rights security is an important factor that shapes risk management strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the linkage
between property rights security and corporate risk management via insurance. Section 3
describes the research design. Section 4 discusses the results from the intra-country analysis.
Section 5 provides a cross-country analysis of insurance purchase and property rights
protection, and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Hypotheses Development: Property Rights Security and Corporate Insurance
This section discusses the linkages between property rights security and corporate
purchase of insurance. Following the reasoning of Cull and Xu (2005) and Levine (2005), we
focus on the effects of three aspects of property rights: the effectiveness of property rights
protection system (including the ease and reliability of contract enforcement), expropriation
risk, and corporate ownership (state vs. private).

Property Rights Protection and Demand for Property Insurance
A firm is always at risk of not getting the returns from its assets due to the actions by the
government, its business clients, competitors and other related parties (Claessens and Laeven,
2003). Strong property rights protection and contract enforcement should boost corporate
demand for insurance for three reasons. First, strong protection of property rights and
enforcement of contracts by the legal system, on the one hand, creates incentives for firms to
9

acquire and insure their assets, because the property and the expected cash flows generated in
using the property are protected (Hussels et al., 2005). On the other hand, the enforcement of
property rights imposes more liabilities on firms and thereby motivates them to take out
insurance as an ex-ante protection against ex-post liabilities.
Second, a strong system of property rights protection and contract enforcement means that
creditors (e.g., insurance policyholders) are better protected in the event of a dispute over
insurance settlement between the insurer and the policyholder and when the insurer is subject
to liquidation, thereby leading to a higher demand for insurance (Skipper, 1998).7 Indeed,
Esho et al. (2004, p. 266) point out “since insurance involves the legal transfer of risk, the
value of the contract is dependent upon legal rules and enforcement, the efficiency of conflict
resolution through the judiciary, and the stability and integrity of the law-making process.”
They show a positive relation between the protection of property rights and P/C insurance
consumption at the country-level using 44 countries for the period 1984-1998.
Third, property rights may affect corporate demand for insurance through the effect on
firms’ growth opportunities. Starting from Besley (1995), a growing body of the literature has
shown that secure property rights provide more incentives of corporate investment and lead
to improved growth opportunities. Cull and Xu (2005) and Johnson et al. (2002) report that in
transition countries, weak property rights discourage corporate reinvestment of earnings even
when bank loans are available. Using cross-country industry-wide data, Claessens and
Laeven (2003) further demonstrate that in environments with weak property rights protection,
firms are less likely to invest in intangible assets such as intellectual property, thereby
dampening their long-term growth. The above reasoning suggests that secure property rights
will lead to more growth opportunities. Firms with more growth opportunities tend to be
more risky (Myers, 1984) and/or have more acute underinvestment problems than firms with
fewer growth opportunities (Froot et al., 1993). Insurance not only reduces the risk of
financial distress, but also lowers the incidence of cash flow shortfalls (following a major
accidental loss) that could trigger a scale-down of attractive investment projects (Froot et al.,
7

Given that insurers have a positive probability of insolvency, insurance liabilities can be viewed as analogous
to risky corporate debt (see Cummins and Danzon, 1997).
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1993).8 Therefore, secure property rights may also lead to a higher corporate demand for
insurance through the positive effect on firms’ growth opportunities.
In addition, the operation of financial markets reflects the effectiveness of property rights
and thereby affects private contracting. Where the degree of marketization of the banking
sector is high, property rights are more likely to be respected and safeguarded. Specifically,
in a more competitive and more market-oriented banking sector, banks have stronger
incentives to allocate credits in an efficient and safe way. Banks are therefore more likely to
request property insurance to retain the value of collateral in granting loans. Our first
hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1: Stronger property rights protection tends to boost corporate demand for
insurance, other things being equal.

Expropriation Risk and Demand for Property Insurance
Government expropriation extracts benefits from owners of property rights and lowers the
owners’ expected payoffs from owning and using assets. As a result, government
expropriation may impede normal business operations, hinder private contracting and the
enforcement of existing contracts, add business uncertainties, and lower the property rights
security of legitimate owners. In China, government expropriation can be in the form of
various non-tax levies, charges and fines, which may be imposed arbitrarily by corrupt
officials (e.g., from tax collection, business license, fire inspection, public utility service,
food hygiene and environment departments). It is important to note that in China such levies
and charges apply to firms of all kinds, regardless of ownership. Where the expropriation risk
is high, business owners may be reluctant to make lumpy capital investments and to insure
their assets.
In addition to government expropriation, expropriation risk might come from
8

Mayers and Smith (1987) analyze a special type of underinvestment problem that may arise in highly levered
firms following a major accidental loss because limited liability gives shareholders a “default put option” to
walk away from a reinvestment project if they feel that the future cash flow benefits are more likely to accrue to
debtholders rather than to themselves. The purchase of insurance coverage can also mitigate this sort of
underinvestment incentive.
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non-government parties (e.g., corrupt bank loan officials). In China, rent seeking in the
banking sector may also decrease corporate demand for property insurance. As Beck et al.
(2006) point out, corruption in bank lending directly affects firms’ financial decisions and
performance in developing countries like China where stock markets are not well developed
and a major source of firm finance is bank loan. In economies (like China) where property
rights protection and the legal system is generally weak, credit allocation might be shaped by
corruption and political ties (Barth et al., 2009; Li et al., 2008, Xie and Lu, 2005).9 Facing
corrupt bank loan officers who are interested in rent seeking, property rights and mechanisms
to safeguard property rights (e.g., the insurance of collateral) are likely to be bypassed. With
bribery payment to loan officers or political tie to the government officials, loan applications
may be approved even if the loan collateral is not backed by property insurance or without
collateral (Li et al., 2008). Therefore, we expect a negative impact of expropriation and
corruption on corporate insurance purchase. Our second hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, the more severe government expropriation is, the less
the corporate demand for insurance would be.

Corporate Ownership and Demand for Property Insurance
Cull and Xu (2005) argue that corporate ownership itself is a measure of the security of
property rights, as it defines the owners of a firm and how their control and cash flow rights
are safeguarded. Relative to private ownership which is in general clearly specified, state
ownership tends to be ambiguously defined and is akin to public goods (Sun et al., 2002). As
a result, though assets of SOEs belong to the whole group of people in theory, no particular
individual has the residual claim rights and so the management and supervision of SOEs in
practice have to be delegated to bureaucrats who do not necessarily have the incentives to
maximize shareholders’ wealth. This has two implications for corporate demand for
insurance.
9

According to a recent survey conducted by People’s Bank of China (the central bank), 81.8% of the
respondents think that corruption in bank lending is quite common in China (Xie and Lu, 2005).
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First, since the identity of the owner is vague, the firm that manages the stated-owned
assets may not have strong incentives to purchase insurance, simply because the property
does not solely belong to the firm or anyone else who would otherwise require the purchase
of insurance.
Second, in addition to the expropriation risk (e.g., the aforementioned various non-tax
levies imposed by the government) that all firms face, SOEs often are directed to pursue
political/social objectives (Chen et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2011). For example, the government
may directly transfer resources among different SOEs for the purposes of cross-subsidizing
certain SOEs that the government believes deserve help. Occasionally, the government may
merge some SOEs with other SOEs through administrative commands. This represents an
additional property rights risk and can lower SOE managers’ incentives to purchase insurance
for the assets in the firm.
On the other hand, we note that it might be possible for some SOEs that are large and
important to obtain some funding help from the government should they suffer severe
uninsured asset losses. This possibility also predicts that SOEs purchase less property
insurance. However, we note that direct government financial assistance have been
significantly reduced since the market-based reform (especially the reform in the banking
sector in mid-1990s) (Zou and Adams, 2008, Firth et al., 2008). It is also difficult to
disentangle the effects of weak property rights security and the possible alternative funding
sources that are associated with state ownership. We therefore provide robustness checks in
Section 4.4 to show that the effects of institution-level property rights protection on corporate
demand for insurance hold if we limit our analyses to privately-controlled firms that are a
cleaner sample than SOEs. We have the following third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Other things being equal, state ownership is likely to be associated with a
lower demand for property insurance.

3. Data and Variables
3.1. The Sample
13

The dataset used in this study is compiled from three sources: 1) the First Economic
Census of Enterprises in China (2005); 2) the World Bank Survey on Governance and
Investment Climate Indexes in 120 Cities in China (2006); 3) the NERI (National Economic
Research Institute of China) Marketization Indexes. The First Economic Census of
Enterprises in China was conducted in 2005 by the National Statistical Bureau, covering all
enterprises in China. This comprehensive survey covered almost all the important aspects of a
firm’s operation during 2004, such as ownership structure, key financial statement variables,
including R&D spending, advertising expenses, etc. More importantly, for the purpose of this
study, the dataset reports firms’ annual spending on property insurance that we use in
constructing our dependent variable. Such information is rarely reported even for listed
companies in their annual reports in other countries. Therefore, the dataset provides a unique
opportunity to explore the effect of property rights security on corporate risk management via
insurance purchase. In addition, the Census covers enterprises of all sizes and enterprises
with various types of ownership structure (i.e., state, foreign and domestic private ownership).
However, a limitation of the dataset is that it only contains one-year cross-sectional data.
We obtained from the Census database a subset of the manufacturing firms that have
annual sales over RMB 5 million (approximately US$650,000) – an official size criterion to
classify enterprises. We focus on relatively large companies as theory predicts that the
insurance decisions of large companies cannot be satisfactorily explained by risk aversion
alone (Mayers and Smith, 1982). The subset of the firms is drawn from 120 major cities (that
are covered by the World Bank Survey on Governance and Investment Climate Indexes) in
China using a stratified random sampling method. Specifically, staff at the State Statistical
Bureau used a computer program and drew a random sample about 33 percent of all
manufacturing firms with annual sales over RMB 5 million in each of the 120 cities. The
actual number of firms entering our regression models is about 55,700 due to missing values
on some variables and this sample size represents about 25 percent of the universe of
manufacturing firms with annual sales over RMB 5 million in China in 2004. Tables 1 and 2
provide brief descriptions and summary statistics of the key variables.
Data on property rights protection and other institutional variables come from two
14

sources: a) the China City Investment and Governance Indexes compiled by the World Bank
that measure the situation in 2004; and b) the marketization indexes for China’s 31 provinces
and autonomous regions that measure the situation in 2003 prepared by the National
Economic Research Institute in China (see Fan et al., 2006). In other words, we use the
contemporaneous values of city-level governance indexes and the one-period lag of
province-level governance indexes. 10 The World Bank City Governance Indexes were
composed based on a World Bank mega-scale enterprise survey on business environment,
property rights protection and local government effectiveness in 120 cities in China in 2004.
The City Governance Indexes contain various sub-indexes on property rights protection,
environment protection, corruption in lending and investment attractiveness to foreign and
private investors, etc. Other city-level information (e.g., GDP, population, and unemployment
rate) are reported as well. Reports on the NERI marketization indexes for China’s 31
provinces and autonomous regions have been published since 2001 and are widely used in
evaluating institutional development and marketization across China. The index ranks each
province and autonomous region based on an aggregate marketization index covering the
relation between the government and market, the development of the private economic sector,
the development of goods and factor markets, the development of market intermediaries and
legal environment. Sub-indexes on each of the above aspects are also available. These
indexes have been widely adopted in studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Jian and Wong, 2010) on
institutional development and corporate finance in China. The variable definition and
summary statistics of the key variables are presented in Tables 1 & 2. The variables are
discussed in detail in the following section.
[Tables 1 & 2 here]
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Measuring the purchase of insurance
10

Using the contemporaneous values of city-level property rights protection indexes is an unavoidable

limitation of our study. However, these indexes that measure institutional developments are relatively stable in
the short run, and as such, we believe using the contemporaneous values should not bias our results in a
significantly way.
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The corporate use of insurance is the dependent variable in our analysis. We use two
insurance measures. The first is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm purchased
insurance in 2004 (Insurance Dummy) and 0 otherwise. The second, widely used in the prior
studies on corporate insurance, is a continuous measure of the extent of insurance use, which
is defined as the ratio of total insurance spending scaled by the average book value of total
assets during the year (Insurance Intensity).11 Overall, about 44% of the firms reported
insurance purchase during 2004 and this proportion is lower than the 85% reported in Zou
and Adams (2006) that use a sample of publicly listed firms in China (Table 2). Such a
difference suggests that insurance is more popular in listed firms than in unlisted firms,
probably because the former firms are subject to closer external monitoring by regulators,
investors and analysts. The mean insurance intensity ratio is about 0.25% and there are large
variations in the insurance intensity evidenced by a standard deviation of 0.62%. However,
one should not hasten to conclude that such level of insurance use is trivial given that the data
presented here are based on insurance premiums rather than on coverage. We can divide the
median insurance intensity ratio (0.27%) of the insured sample by 0.3% to gain a rough idea
of the percentage of coverage relative to tangible assets and the proportion covered is about
90% of the average book value of tangible assets during the year in firms carrying
insurance.12 Therefore, it appears that our sample of firms purchased significant amounts of
property insurance.

3.2.2. Measuring property rights protection and contract enforcement
We include two index variables to measure the degree of property rights protection and
contract enforcement. The first index (Property Rights Protection) is a city level index that
measures the likelihood that the legal system will uphold business contracts and property
rights in business disputes in 2004. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a high value indicating
11

Other potential insurance measures such as insurance coverage cannot be used due to the unavailability of

insurance coverage.
12

Property insurance premiums rates vary according to the nature of the business. 0.3% is roughly the mean of

the premiums rates charged by the Peoples’ Insurance Company of China (PICC) (a major insurance provider in
China) on an average industrial business basis.
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better property rights protection and contract enforcement. A similar index was used by Cull
and Xu (2005) in their study of the property rights security on firm reinvestment. The second
index (Banking Sector Marketization) measures the relative ranking of the financial market
development across provinces in 2003. Specifically, the index captures two aspects of the
regional credit market: 1) the competitiveness of the banking sector based on the market
structure; 2) the extent to which the banks employ economic criteria in the credit allocation
process. The index is obtained from Fan et al. (2006). Higher values indicate a more
market-oriented banking sector. As we discussed earlier, we expect a positive linkage
between banking sector marketization and the corporate use of insurance.

3.2.3. Measuring expropriation risk
We use two expropriation risk proxies. The first one (Reducing Non-tax Levies and
Charges) is a 2003 NERI index obtained from Fan et al. (2006) measuring the provincial
business environment about the extent of reducing non-tax government levies and charges in
2003. Higher values indicate less non-tax government levies and charges to the firms. The
second proxy (Bank Corruption Index) is a city-level index for 2004 defined as the ratio of
(expected) informal payments made to bank loan officers scaled by the loan size. The index is
obtained from the World Bank 2006 Survey and varies across the 120 cities with a range from
0 to 28%.

3.2.4. Measuring corporate ownership
We use two variables to measure the corporate ownership structure. The first is a dummy
variable taking one for SOEs (including collectively-owned enterprises that are quasi-SOEs)
(State Dummy).13 The second ownership variable measures the proportion of state ownership
in a firm’s ownership structure (i.e., Percent State Ownership). As Table 2 shows, about 15%
of sample firms are controlled by the state. These figures confirm the importance of private
firms in the national economy in China. When the state dummy is used in analysis, the
13

However, our results on state ownership are not sensitive if we categorize collectively-owned enterprises as

private firms.
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benchmark group comprises of private firms.
Table 2 Panel B presents the correlation coefficients between the five proxies of property
rights security at the city level.14 As expected, generally, there is a positive and statistically
significant correlation between the first three property rights security proxies, and a negative
correlation between the first three proxies and the last two (inverse) property rights security
proxies. A reliability of the internal consistency among these five proxies generates a test
scale of alpha value = 0.644, suggesting that these five proxes are reasonably consistent.

3.2.5. Firm-level control variables
In addition to the variables discussed above, we follow prior studies on corporate
insurance (e.g., Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1990; Zou and Adams,
2006) and include in our regression models a host of firm characteristics that may affect the
corporate purchase of insurance.
We first control for the effect of firm size (measured as the natural logarithm of book value
of total assets) and asset tangibility (defined as the ratio of the book value of fixed assets and
inventory to the book value of total assets) on corporate purchase of insurance. Prior studies
generally find small firms, which have limited financial resources and/or lack risk
management expertise, tend to buy relatively more insurance than large companies. Asset
tangibility is included to control for the impacts of differences in asset structure, collateral
and debt capacity on property insurance purchases, and we expect a positive relation between
asset tangibility and the purchase of insurance.
As we discussed in Section 3, growth firms tend to have a higher demand for insurance in
order to reduce firm risk and/or mitigate the underinvestment problem. We use the R&D
Intensity (R&D spending/total assets) and Advertising Effort (advertising spending/total
assets) as proxies of growth opportunities and expect that they exhibit a positive relation with
corporate use of insurance.
Quick ratio, defined as (current assets – inventory)/current liabilities, is included to control
14

We aggregate the state ownership to the city level by taking the average state ownership of all firms in that

city.
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for the effect of liquidity on the purchase of insurance. Financial constraints (denoted by a
low quick ratio) may limit corporate risk management activities (Haushalter, 2000) or induce
a firm to purchase property insurance (e.g., on collateral) in order to secure bank loan in
China.
While market reforms have significantly weakened firms’ affiliations with the government,
some firms (particularly SOEs) may be able to obtain subsidies from the government in the
form of tax rebates and/or direct fiscal assistance. We control for the potential effect of
subsidies received on corporate purchase of insurance by including a fiscal subsidy to sales
ratio (Fiscal Subsidy Ratio) in our analysis.
Tax position: Smith and Stulz (1985), among others, argue that risk management can help
reduce the expected tax liability in firms with a convex tax schedule. Tax convexity may
result from progressivity in statutory tax rates (e.g., in the U.S.) and the presence of tax
preferential items (e.g., investment tax credits and operating losses) (e.g., see Mayers and
Smith, 1982). China has a flat corporate income tax rate of 33% in our sample period,
however, tax convexity may arise because the tax code only allows a maximum of five-year
carry-forwards of operating losses and carry-backs of operating losses are not permitted.
Additionally, the tax code allows tax exemptions or rebates to certain businesses (e.g.,
foreign-invested firms and government approved high-tech companies) (Zou and Adams,
2008). We therefore create a Tax Credit Dummy that equals one if the current effective tax
rate (income tax/taxable income) is less than the standard rate of 33%, suggesting the
existence of tax credit items. We expect a positive relation between Tax Credit Dummy and
corporate insurance because insurance coverage can help reduce the chance of reporting a
loss (following an accidental event) and thereby retain the value of tax credits.
We also control for the effect of firms’ dependence on external debt financing (Debt
Dependence). More debt-reliant firms are expected to have more incentives to purchase
property insurance in order to lower expected costs of financial distress and secure bank loans
(the major source of corporate financing in China). Following Grullon et al. (2006), we
measure debt finance dependence as industry median leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of
total debt to assets. Industry is classified by the two-digit industry code in China. Using
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industry-wide leverage instead of firm-specific leverage is desirable is because similar firms
tend to share commonalities in the factors that affect their capital structure and many firms
tend to use industry average leverage ratio as a target debt ratio (see Bradley, Jarrell and Kim,
1984; Gilson, 1997; Grullon et al., 2006; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).15 However, our results
regarding property rights security are robust if we use firm-level leverage.
Industry effects: Adam et al. (2007) argue that firms in more competitive industries are
more likely to hedge their risks than firms in other industries, because such firms may be
more vulnerable to severe cash shortfalls following (accidental) loss events and face the risk
of losing their key customers and suppliers. Therefore, the impact of product-market
competition on corporate insurance purchase is an interesting question that, to our knowledge,
has not been explicitly tested before. We measure industry competition as the natural log of
the total number of firms nationwide with the same four-digit industry code. We also include
the two-digit industry dummies in our regressions to control for the risk differences among
industries.
Firm age (i.e., the number of years since establishment) is included as a further control for
the effect of differences in growth opportunities and assets structure on insurance purchase
(Bartram et al., 2006). For example, old firms may be more mature and may have more assets
in place that are at risk than young firms. In addition, mature firms typically use more debt
than young firms. Therefore, we expect old firms to use more property insurance than young
firms, other things being equal. Finally, we control for whether a firm is a listed firm as listed
firms are subject to more monitoring by regulators, investors and analysts and this higher
visibility may affect a firm’s risk management decisions.

3.2.6. Other control variables
To control for the potential effects of differences in economic development (and
institutions) across regions on the corporate purchase of insurance, we include GDP per
capita and Unemployment Rate in our models.
15

In contrast, the current leverage ratio may merely represent a short-term swing from a firm’s target debt ratio

and such swing is to be rebalanced by management.
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Insurance supply-side factors may affect corporate purchase of insurance. For example,
one may argue that firms may buy more insurance if insurance price in the region is cheaper.
This, however, is not a concern in China as the China Insurance Regulatory Commission
(CIRC) tightly regulates property insurance pricing by setting the benchmark premium rates
for the majority of corporate property insurance products and standardizes insurers’
underwriting practices by issuing uniform guidelines on risk rating and applicable classified
premium rates (e.g., based on the type of business to be covered) (Zou and Adams, 2006).
The Insurance Law also forbids insurers to realize competitive advantages by giving their
customers premium rebates. The three dominating insurance groups (i.e., PICC, China Pingan
Insurance, China Pacific Insurance) also have their branches throughout the country. The
products provided by each of them are largely homogenous across different parts of the
countries. This feature of property insurance market in China makes it a cleaner research
setting in which to test our hypotheses and we therefore believe corporate purchase of
insurance is unlikely to be driven by regional differences in insurance prices or product
availability. Furthermore, to the extent that insurance market development correlates with
economic development, the inclusion of GDP per Capita as a control renders more control
for the supply effects.
We checked the correlations between the measures of property rights and
firm-characteristic variables and found all the correlation coefficients in the models employed
are below 0.5. We also calculated the variance inflation factor of each independent variable
and found no evidence of multicollinearity.

4. Empirical Results
4.1. The Probit model
We first employ a Probit model to test the effect of property rights security on firms’
propensity to take out insurance. We then use a Tobit model to test the effect of property
rights security on the financial extent of insurance use. As Zou and Adams (2006) point out,
separate analysis of participation and volume decisions could yield interesting insights into
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those factors that influence the ex ante and ex post managerial insurance decisions.16 The
probability (likelihood) function of purchasing insurance is expressed as follows:
Pr (Insurance Dummy=1) = f (Property Rights Protection Index, Banking Sector
Marketization, Reducing Non-tax Levies and Charges, Banking Corruption Index, State
Ownership, Control Variables) +ε

(1)

Due to the non-linearity, the magnitude of coefficients in the Probit models cannot be
directly read like those in the OLS regressions. We report marginal effects evaluated at the
means of the independent variables from the regressions to facilitate the interpretation of
results. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the
expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. We use
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the city level in computing t-values.
Therefore, we explicitly allow for the cross-sectional correlation caused by city-specific
factors (e.g., legal environment and area-specific catastrophe risk like flooding). The basic
empirical results are presented in Table 3.

[Table 3 here]

As can be seen from Columns (1) & (2) of Table 3, both the Property Rights Protection
Index and Banking Sector Marketization index are positively and significantly associated
with the likelihood of corporate insurance purchase, which is consistent with our hypothesis
that stronger property rights protection and better contract enforcement provide more
incentives for firms to insure their assets. The (inverse) government expropriation risk proxy
(Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges) also, as expected, has a positive and significant
coefficient, suggesting that firms from regions with lower government non-tax levies and
charges are more likely to take out property insurance than other firms. Albeit with a negative
sign, the coefficient of the Bank Corruption Index is not statistically significant.
The coefficients of the State Dummy and Percent State Ownership are negative and
16

We also tried a Cragg’s (1971) extension of the Tobit model that allows different parameter values for the
insurance participation and volume decisions, but the second-stage volume decision failed to converge,
suggesting that this model is not suitable for use on our dataset.
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significant at the 1% level, suggesting that SOEs are less likely to purchase insurance than
private firms. These results thus provide some support for our hypothesis about the effect of
state ownership on corporate insurance purchase.
Among the control variables of corporate insurance purchase, the coefficients of Firm Size
are positive and significant at the 1% across model specifications, suggesting that larger firms
are more likely to insure their assets than small companies. This finding, albeit contrary to
theory (Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008), is consistent with the results reported in Zou and
Adams (2006). An explanation is that the firms in our sample are relatively small. Indeed, the
median natural log of book value of total assets (Firm Size) is 9.397 (which is about RMB
120.52 million in total assets) compared with the same figure 11.881 (about RMB 1.44 billion
in total assets) in Zou and Adams (2008) that use a sample of listed firms in China. As
expected, the coefficients of Debt Finance Dependence and Tangibility are positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that firms from finance dependent industries and firms
have relatively more tangible assets are more likely to take out property insurance.
Also, as expected, the two proxies for growth opportunities (R&D Intensity and
Advertising Efforts) are found to have a positive and significant impact on a firm’s propensity
to purchase insurance. These results are consistent with the argument that firms facing more
growth opportunities tend to be more risky and/or have higher agency costs of
underinvestment problems than firms with fewer growth opportunities (Froot et al., 1993;
Mayers and Smith, 1987).
Quick ratio is found to have a negative significant effect on the incidence of property
insurance. This is plausible because liquid firms may have less need to use insurance as
contingent financing, or alternatively, firms with a low liquidity purchase insurance to
facilitate obtaining bank loans.
The other control variables also yield interesting results. Older companies are found to be
more likely to purchase insurance probably because they have more insurable tangible assets
in place than younger firms. With respect to the macro control variables, Unemployment rate
is positively related to firms’ likelihood of purchasing insurance perhaps because the asset
loss risk in regions with a high unemployment rate is high. No other variables are found to
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have material impacts on firms’ propensity to purchase insurance.

4.2. The Tobit model
The above analyses focus on the impact of property rights security on the incidence of
insurance. We now turn to the impact of property rights security on the financial extent of
insurance purchase. Since the dependent variable is left censored at 0, Tobit model is
employed in the analysis. The Tobit models are estimated using maximum likelihood
estimation. The results are presented in Columns (3) & (4) of Table 3. Again, the coefficient
estimates of the Tobit models are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at
the means of the independent variables from the regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy
variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable
as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. We again use heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors clustered at the city level in computing t-values to allow for the cross-sectional
correlation.
As can be seen from Table 3 and consistent with the findings from the Probit analysis, the
coefficients of Property Rights Protection Index and Banking Sector Marketization index are
positive and significant at the 1% level in all model specifications, suggesting that stronger
property rights protection, better contract enforcement and a more market-oriented banking
sector lead to more corporate consumption of property insurance. Again, the coefficients of
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that
firms from regions with less government expropriation tend to purchase more property
insurance than do other firms.
The results on state ownership variables derived from the Tobit estimations are consistent
with our findings from the Probit analysis. The coefficients of the State Dummy and Percent
State Ownership are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that
SOEs tend to purchase less insurance than private firms.
The two proxies for growth opportunities (R&D Intensity and Advertising Efforts) are,
again, found to have a positive and significant influence on the extent of insurance purchased.
The coefficient of Tangibility is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that firms do
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not purchase insurance in amounts proportionate to asset tangibility though firms with higher
asset tangibility intensity are more likely to purchase insurance in the first place. This could
arise because property insurance is related to the replacement value of assets rather than the
book value of assets. Alternatively, the marginal benefit of increasing property insurance may
be declining once a certain level of coverage is obtained. These results on asset tangibility are
consistent with the findings of Zou and Adams (2006) in their study of insurance purchases
by a small sample of publicly listed Chinese firms.
Different from our expectation, the coefficients of Firm Size are positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that large sample firms tend to buy more property insurance than small
firms. As we pointed earlier, one reason may be that our sample firms are relatively small.
The coefficient of Debt Finance Dependence is positive and statistically significant,
suggesting that firms from finance dependent industries and/or those have a higher target debt
ratio purchase more insurance than other firms. Older companies tend to purchase more
insurance than younger firms. Firms from more economically developed areas (proxyed by a
high GDP per capita) tend to purchase less insurance on a relative basis. Perhaps firms from
more economically developed areas are more capable of self insuring some asset-loss risks.
Moreover, listed firms are found to have a higher insurance intensity than unlisted firms,
other things being equal, possibly reflecting the effects of more monitoring in these firms and
their more visibility on risk management decisions. No other variables are found to have
significant impacts on the extent of corporate insurance.

4.3. Further Results from the Split-Sample Analysis
Our previous results show that property rights protection is associated with a higher
corporate demand for insurance. We suspect that among our three measures of property rights
security, the regional property protection index may have a first-order effect. To study
whether the effect of corporate ownership and government expropriation on corporate
purchase of insurance is conditional on the overall environment of property rights protection,
we split the sample into cities with good property rights protection and contract enforcement
(the cities with Property Rights Protection Index above the sample median) and poor property
25

rights protection and contract enforcement (the cities with Property Rights Protection Index
below the sample median) and repeat the regression analysis in each sub-sample. The
empirical results are presented in Table 4.

[Table 4 here]

There are three interesting findings. First, reducing government expropriation only
significantly increases corporate demand for insurance when regional protection of property
rights is strong. Second, in regions with weak property rights protection, the effect of bank
lending corruption on corporate purchase of property insurance is negative (with the
coefficient being significant in the Probit model). Therefore, corruption in bank lending
seems to reduce firms’ likelihood of insurance purchase when local protection of property
rights is poor. Third, the negative effect of state ownership on corporate purchase of
insurance is attenuated by the strong property right protection. Indeed, according to Wald
tests, the difference in the coefficient of Percent State Ownership between the group with
strong property right protection and the group with weak property rights protection in the
Probit model is 0.030 with a p-value of 0.058 (two-tailed). The difference in the coefficient of
Percent State Ownership between the group with strong property right protection and the
group with weak property rights protection in the Tobit model is 0.045, with a p-value of
0.001 (two-tailed). In other words, in areas where property rights protection is weak, SOEs
tend to buy less property insurance, other things being equal. These findings suggest that a
region’s overall protection of property rights seems to have a first-order effect on corporate
demand for property insurance, while the effects of other institution- and firm-level property
rights proxies are conditional on a region’s overall protection of property rights.
In addition, firms from economically more developed areas have a lower demand for
property insurance only when the region’s property rights protection is weak, further
highlighting the importance of property rights protection. The other variables have similar
impacts on corporate purchase of insurance in both samples.
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4.4. Results from using only privately-controlled firms
As noted earlier, a finding of a negative effect of state ownership on the purchase of
property insurance is not only consistent with the argument that SOEs have a weak property
rights security, but also in line with the possible alternative funding sources available to
SOEs. In this section, we focus on privately-controlled firms and test the robustness of our
findings on hypotheses 1 & 2. Analysis based on privately-controlled firms provides a
sharper and cleaner test of how institution-level property rights protection shapes corporate
property insurance decisions. Below we repeat our analyses in Tables 3 and 4 using firms that
have private ownership over 50% and the results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. It is clear
that our major results from using only private firms confirm our previous main finding – i.e.,
weak property rights protection discourages firms from engage in risk management activities
via insurance.

[Table 5 and 6 here]

4.5. Results from split-sample analysis by listing status
Listed firms may face more stringent regulations and are subject to more monitoring by
investors and analysts than unlisted firms. As a result, city-level property right protection may
not have as large an impact on listed firms as on unlisted firms. To investigate this possibility,
we repeat the regression analysis regarding the effects of property rights security on corporate
purchase of property insurance separately for listed firms and unlisted firms.17 We focus on
privately controlled firms (i.e., non-SOEs) since they are cleaner setting in which to test the
effects of property rights protection on insurance purchases. The results are reported in Table
7.
The results show while Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges still exerts a positive and
significant effect on the incidence and extent of property insurance purchase, the positive
effect of Property Rights Protection Index and Banking Sector Marketization on insurance

17

We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this.
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purchases is only present in unlisted firms. On the other hand, the coefficient of Bank
Corruption Index is negative and marginally significant at the 10% level in the Probit model
for listed firms, but insignificant in models for unlisted firms. Therefore, there is some
evidence that city-level property right protection affects the insurance decisions of listed
companies to a less extent compared with their unlisted counterparts.

[Table 7 here]

5. Evidence from a Cross-Country Analysis
Thus far, we have provided evidence on the effects of regional property rights protection
on the corporate purchase of P/C insurance using detailed firm-level insurance data from
China. One may wonder how generalizable the result is. In this section, we attempt to provide
additional evidence of property rights protection on the purchase of P/C insurance within an
international context. Two caveats are in order. First, it is not possible to obtain firm-level
insurance data within an international context because firm-level insurance spending is only
uniquely available from China (see footnote 1 for details). As a result, the analysis must be
carried out at the country level. Second, we are unable to separate from the aggregate
insurance data the portion of corporate purchase of insurance. These two caveats mean that
the cross-country analysis presented in this section should not be construed as a simple
extension of our intra-country analysis that is much more detailed. Nevertheless, we believe
the cross-country validation adds additional rigor to our single-country analysis and sheds
further insights into the importance of property rights protection to the purchase of P/C
insurance. Our analysis based on a more complete and more recent dataset (93 countries over
1995-2008), and therefore our study also extends the prior research by Esho et al. (2004).

5.1. Data and Variables
We purchased P/C insurance data from Swiss Re, a leading reinsurance company in the
world and famous for its authoritative insurance statistics and research for 93 countries for
the period 1995-2008. As Esho et al. (2004), we measure consumption of P/C insurance as
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Insurance Premium per Capita (measured in US dollars) in corresponding years.
In line with our analysis of China, we measure property rights protection with three
categories of indexes measuring (a) the rule of law and contract enforcement; (b) banking
sector development and marketization;18 and (c) corruption and expropriation risk that is an
inverse proxy for the cleanliness of the government. We conducted a comprehensive study
and obtained several indexes from various authoritative sources.
For (a), we have two indexes – i.e., the rule-of-law index compiled by the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), (hereafter as ROL of ICRG) and the index on legal structure and
security of property rights compiled by the Economic Freedom Network (hereafter as LSSPR
of EFN). Please see Table 1 for details of variable definition and data source.
For (b), we have two measures. The first is Bank Credit/GDP, measuring the importance
of bank-intermediated finance to the national economy 19 . If banks typically require a
borrowing company to take out property insurance, this ratio should have a positive effect on
P/C insurance consumption. The second is a proxy for the competitiveness of banking
business (Bank Concentration), which is defined as the proportion of assets owned by the
three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks in a country. Higher
concentration generally means a lower level of competition within the banking industry
(Barth et al., 2009). Banks in such countries may have fewer incentives to request collateral
and insurance coverage of collateral in lending. Alternatively, corruption in lending may
substitute for the insurance requirement. We therefore expect Bank Concentration to have a
negative effect on P/C insurance consumption. These two measures are extracted from the
World Bank website.
For (c), we have the index on control of corruption prepared by the World Bank (hereafter
as COC of WB), freedom from corruption prepared by the Heritage Foundation (hereafter as
FFC of HF).
In addition to the above variables, we also include the GDP per Capita (measured in
18

We focus on private debt because a collateral requirement and associated insurance is less common in public
debt (e.g., bond).
19
This ratio has been widely used as a measure for financial development (e.g., Beck et al. 2000, Beck and
Levine, 2002).
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thousand US dollars) to control for the effect of income and economic development on the
purchase of P/C insurance and expect it to have a positive effect. We then match these
variables with the insurance data. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we lag all
explanatory variables by one period. Occasionally, an explanatory variable may have a gap in
data availability, and in such a case, we use the variable’s value that is immediately available
before year t to match with the insurance variable in year t. For instance, ROL of ICRG and
COC of WB only have values for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and each year from 2002 onwards.
For the insurance variable in year 1998, we use the value of ROL and COC in 1996 in
modeling.20 The actual number of observations and countries entering the regression varies
according to which variables are used. These different numbers of observations in different
model specifications provide a good opportunity to examine the robustness of our results.
Table 8 Panel A provides summary statistics of the variables used in the cross-country
analysis. It is apparent that Insurance Premium per capita is highly skewed and we therefore
use the natural log of the variable in our regression analysis. Panel B presents the correlation
coefficients between the dependent variable and the various proxies for property rights
protection. As predicted, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between
Insurance Premium per capita and proxies for property rights protection. It is also evident
that the various indexes for property rights protection that are obtained from different sources
are highly correlated. A reliability test of the internal consistency of these four measures
produces a test scale for the alpha value = 0.961. This lends credence to these indexes as
reasonable proxies for a country’s protection of property rights. However, because of the high
correlation coefficients between these proxies for property rights protection, we only include
one proxy at a time to avoid multicollinearity.

[Table 8 here]

Our data set is a panel. We can, in theory, run a Hausman specification test to ascertain
whether fixed or random-effects models are econometrically more appropriate. There is,
20

The ISSPR of EFN does not have values between 1996 and 1999.
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however, an additional factor relating to the nature of our data to consider. These
country-level indexes may reflect institutional features that are slowly evolving and indeed
some proxies are not compiled each year. This poses an identification issue to the
fixed-effects estimation due to the correlation between country fixed-effects and property
protection indexes that may have limited time-series variations (Zhou, 2001). We therefore
report in Table 8 the results from both a fixed-effects and random-effects estimation.21

We

report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country level in computing
t-values to allow for the within-country but between-year correlation.
As Table 9 shows, all the four proxies for property rights protection have a positive
regression coefficient and the coefficient is statistically significant except for ln(FFC of HF)
in the fixed-effects model. Because of the potential low power of a fixed effects estimation
when a test variable has limited time-series variations, we place more reliance on the
random-effects estimation.22
As for the control variables, consistent with our expectation, the coefficient of Bank
Concentration is negative and statistically significant in all the estimations. Therefore, in
countries that lack market competition in the banking sector, banks tend to have fewer
incentives to request collateral and associated insurance in lending. Alternatively, corruption
in lending may circumvent the insurance requirement. The coefficient of Bank Credit/GDP is
insignificant in all the models, which suggests that insurance purchase is not a direct
derivative of using bank credit. Moreover, the level of economic development, in general, has
a positive effect on the consumption of insurance, though its significance varies between a
fixed- and random-effects model. Overall, the results from the cross-country analysis
validates our key finding from the single-country analysis that strong property rights
protection leads to more use of property insurance as a risk management mechanism.

[Table 9 here]
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Unreported pooled OLS models using clustered standard errors at the country level suggest all the property

rights indexes have a positive and statistically significant regression coefficient in the insurance model.
22

For example, a random check of the FFC of HF suggests that ALBANIA scored 10 between 1995 and 2000.
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6. Conclusion
Taking advantage of a large and unique firm-level dataset on corporate insurance that is
recently available from China’s first economic census, this study empirically tests the effects
of property rights security on the corporate risk management via insurance use. Following the
recent literature (e.g., Cull and Xu, 2005; Levine, 2005), we measure property rights security
at both the institution- and firm-level. We obtain the following results. First, firms located in
regions with better property rights protection, lower government expropriation risk, and/or a
more market-oriented banking sector, have more incentives to insure their assets. Second,
relative to private ownership, state ownership tends to be associated with a lower incidence
and extent of insurance use. Third, in areas with a lower-than-sample-median index of
property rights protection, corruption in bank lending seems to have a negative effect on
corporate demand for insurance, and reducing non-tax levies & charges does not increase
corporate demand for insurance. Our tests also suggest that the strength of the property rights
protection afforded by the local legal system has a first-order effect on corporate demand for
property insurance, while the effects of other institution- and firm-level property rights
proxies are conditional on a region’s overall protection of property rights. Our results
regarding institution-level property rights protection are robust to limiting the analysis to
privately controlled firms that are a cleaner sample for testing the effects of property rights
protection on corporate purchase of property insurance. The importance of property rights
protection is further underpinned by our cross-country results from using 93 countries for the
period 1995-2008. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that the degree of
property rights security is an important determinant of corporate insurance decisions.
Our study represents the first study focusing on the important relation between property
rights security and corporate risk management. The documented evidence adds to the
expanding body of research on the importance of property rights and investor protection to
corporate financial decisions. Prior studies (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Mayers and Smith,
1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Zou, 2010; Zou and Adams, 2008) have shown both
theoretically and empirically that corporate risk management can be value increasing in the
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presence of market imperfections, for example, via coordinating a firm’s financing and
investment decisions. An important policy implication of our results is that weak property
rights protection also hurts firms (the basic economic units) and their investors by inhibiting
their use of corporate risk management in coordinating firms’ financing and investment
decisions. This should ultimately compromise a country’s economic growth. Future study
should benefit from examining the effect of property rights security and corporate derivative
hedging when reliable derivatives data are available.
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Table 1
Variable definitions
Variable

Definition

Dependent variables
Insurance Dummy

1 = a firm bought property insurance in 2004

Insurance Intensity (%)

Annual spending on property insurance/the average assets value in 2004
×100%, winsorized at the 1% at both tails.

Test variables
Property Rights
Protection Index

The city-level index measures the likelihood that a firm’s contractual and
property rights are protected in business disputes in 2004. (Obtained from
the World Bank Survey 2006)

Banking Sector
Marketization

The index measures the relative ranking of financial market development
across provinces based on the proportion of deposits attracted by non-stateowned banks and the proportion of bank loans provided to non-state-owned
firms in 2003. (Obtained from Fan et al. (2006))

Reducing Non-tax Levies
& Charges
(an inverse proxy for
expropriation risk)

The province-level index measures the relative ranking of government
imposed non-tax levies & charges on local firms in 2003. (Obtained from F
an et al. (2006))

Bank Corruption Index
(expropriation proxy)

The city-level index measures the expected informal payments to bank officials as
a percentage of bank loan obtained in 2004. (Obtained from the World Bank
Survey 2006)

State Dummy

1 = a firm is majority State-owned or collectively-owned (with ownership
more than 50%) and 0 for otherwise

Percent State Ownership

Capital contributed by the state and collective / total registered capital

Control variables
Firm Size

Defined as the natural log of book value of total assets

R&D Intensity

R&D spending/total assets, winsorized at the 1% at both tails.

Advertising Effort

Advertising expense/total assets, winsorized at the 1% at both tails.

Tangibility

(inventory + net book value of fixed assets)/total assets, winsorized at the
1% at both tails.

Fiscal Subsidy Ratio

Total subsidies received from local government/sales, winsorized at the 1% a
t both tails.

Quick Ratio

Ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities (not including inventory),
winsorized at the 1% at both tails.

Tax Credit Dummy

Equals 1 if current tax rate (income tax/taxable income)<33%,
suggesting the existence of preferential tax credit items or tax shields.

Utilities Firm Dummy

Regulated (utilities) firm dummy, 1 = if the firm is an utilities firm.

Dept Finance Dependence Proxied by industry median leverage ratio (determined by two-digit industry
code)
Industry Competition

Natural log of the number of firms having the same 4-digit industry
code nationally (obtained from China’s Market Statistical Yearbook 2005)

Firm Age

The natural log of number of years since business commencement
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Unemployment Rate

Unemployment rate of a city

GDP per Capita

Natural log of Real GDP per capita (RMB)

Explanatory variables for cross-country analysis
ROL of ICRG

Rule-of-law index compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG),
capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence. A high value means better property rights protection. Lagged
value used.
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

ISSPR of EFN

Index on legal structure and security of property rights compiled by the
Economic Freedom Network (see Gwartney et al., 2009). A high value
means better property rights protection. Lagged value used.
Source: http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html

COC of WB

Index on control of corruption compiled by the World Bank (with a high
value for low corruption). Lagged value used.
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

FFC of HF

Index on freedom from corruption compiled by the Heritage Foundation.
A high value means low corruption. Lagged value used.
Source: http://www.heritage.org/Index/Download.aspx

Bank Concentration

The proportion of total assets owned by the three largest banks to the
total assets of commercial banks in a country. Lagged value used.
Source: http://econ.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extdec/extresearch

Bank Credit/GDP

Lagged value used.
Source: http://econ.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extdec/extresearch

GDP per Capita

GDP/population, GDP is measured in thousand US dollars. Lagged value u
sed.
Source: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28
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Table 2
Summary statistics of main variables
Panel A
Variables
Insurance Dummy
Insurance Intensity (%)
Insurance Intensity (%) (insured
sample)
Property Rights Protection Index
Banking Sector Marketization
Reducing Non-tax Levies &
Charges
Bank Corruption Index
State Dummy
Percent State Ownership
Firm Size
R&D Intensity
Advertising Effort
Tangibility
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio
Quick Ratio
Tax Credit Dummy
Debt Finance Dependence
Industrial Competition
Firm Age
Unemployment Rate
GDP per Capita
Listing dummy

Mean

Median

SD

Min

Max

0.438
0.246

0.000
0.000

0.496
0.617

0.000
0.000

1.000
4.297

55702
55702

0.562
0.679
8.040

0.267
0.702
8.520

0.831
0.172
1.777

0.000
0.269
2.670

4.297
0.982
10.170

24402
55702
55702

10.049
0.056
0.145
0.135
9.606
0.002
0.001
0.471
0.003
1.302
0.815
0.592
6.634
1.667
3.175
9.490
0.024

9.960
0.046
0.000
0.000
9.397
0.000
0.000
0.465
0.000
0.791
1.000
0.596
6.663
1.609
3.500
9.572
0.000

0.765
0.036
0.352
0.325
1.423
0.009
0.004
0.215
0.011
2.111
0.388
0.042
1.169
0.951
1.160
0.619
0.152

5.440
0.000
0.000
0.000
3.555
0.000
0.000
0.049
0.000
0.046
0.000
0.428
0.693
0.000
0.500
7.517
0.000

12.000
0.280
1.000
1.000
18.469
0.070
0.030
0.943
0.075
16.333
1.000
0.661
9.097
6.001
8.500
10.511
1.000

55702
55702
55702
55607
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702
55702

Panel B: correlation between proxies for property rights security at the city level
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Property Rights Protection Index
(a)
1.000
Banking Sector Marketization

N

(b)

(e)

0.268
1.000
(0.003)
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges
(c)
0.103
0.272
1.000
(0.251) (0.002)
Bank Corruption Index
(d)
-0.288
-0.187
-0.321
1.000
(0.001) (0.037) (0.000)
Percent State Ownership
(e)
-0.398
-0.646
-0.030
0.143
1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.743) (0.112)
Note: reported in parentheses are p-values (two-tailed). A reliability test of the internal consistency among these
proxies produces a test scale for alpha value =0.644. Percent state ownership is the mean of state ownership of
each city.
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Table 3
Property rights security and the incidence & extent of insurance purchases
Dependent variable
Insurance dummy
Insurance intensity (%)

Property Rights Protection Index
Banking Sector Marketization
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges
Bank Corruption Index
State Dummy

Probit
(1)
0.121***
[2.743]
0.024***
[4.181]
0.031***
[2.973]
-0.195
[-0.664]
-0.050***
[-5.610]

Percent State Ownership
Firm Size
R&D Intensity
Advertising Effort
Tangibility
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio
Quick Ratio
Tax Credit Dummy
Debt Finance Dependence
Industrial Competition
Firm Age
Unemployment Rate
GDP per Capita
Listing dummy

0.093***
[31.137]
1.261***
[3.899]
7.124***
[8.593]
0.101***
[7.089]
0.360
[1.422]
-0.005***
[-4.238]
-0.008
[-1.006]
1.296***
[10.535]
0.001
[0.236]
0.051***
[15.172]
0.016**
[2.239]
-0.017
[-1.015]
0.008
[0.639]

Probit
(2)
0.121***
[2.739]
0.024***
[4.195]
0.031***
[3.008]
-0.192
[-0.654]

-0.066***
[-7.453]
0.092***
[31.229]
1.238***
[3.763]
7.081***
[8.520]
0.101***
[7.093]
0.379
[1.488]
-0.005***
[-4.309]
-0.008
[-1.057]
1.274***
[10.250]
0.001
[0.315]
0.052***
[15.470]
0.016**
[2.313]
-0.017
[-1.009]
0.006
[0.430]

Tobit
(3)
0.096***
[3.470]
0.016***
[4.365]
0.022***
[3.127]
0.024
[0.128]
-0.041***
[-5.560]

0.024***
[8.350]
0.612**
[2.475]
7.404***
[8.520]
-0.140***
[-11.149]
-0.040
[-0.221]
-0.001
[-0.797]
-0.006
[-0.743]
0.722***
[6.576]
0.001
[0.203]
0.036***
[12.933]
0.005
[1.207]
-0.020*
[-1.776]
0.019*
[1.755]

Tobit
(4)
0.096***
[3.425]
0.016***
[4.407]
0.022***
[3.079]
0.023
[0.125]

-0.051***
[-6.327]
0.023***
[8.311]
0.589**
[2.336]
7.389***
[8.417]
-0.139***
[-11.091]
-0.028
[-0.160]
-0.001
[-0.867]
-0.006
[-0.794]
0.709***
[6.396]
0.001
[0.311]
0.037***
[13.562]
0.006
[1.242]
-0.020*
[-1.757]
0.017
[1.517]

Two-digit industry dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
0.155
0.156
0.017
0.017
Pseudo-R2
N
55,702
55,607
55,702
55,607
Marginal effects are reported. Reported in parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the city level to allow for cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, *
denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included
in all models but its coefficient is unreported for brevity.
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Table 4
Sub-group analysis by property rights protection
Probit
(strong
rights)
(1)
Banking Sector Marketization
0.032***
[3.680]
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges
0.049***
[2.885]
Bank Corruption Index
0.106
[0.241]
Percent State Ownership
-0.045***
[-3.342]
Firm Size
0.088***
[23.867]
R&D Intensity
1.814***
[3.876]
Advertising Effort
6.415***
[4.582]
Tangibility
0.103***
[4.892]
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio
0.721
[1.558]
Quick Ratio
-0.005***
[-2.821]
Tax Credit Dummy
-0.022**
[-2.369]
Debt Finance Dependence
1.214***
[7.769]
Industrial Competition
0.001
[0.296]
Firm Age
0.059***
[12.192]
Unemployment Rate
0.022**
[2.437]
GDP per Capita
0.023
[0.906]
Listing dummy
-0.017
[-0.950]

Tobit
(strong
rights)
(2)
0.018***
[3.623]
0.043***
[3.702]
0.199
[0.724]
-0.023**
[-1.988]
0.017***
[4.211]
0.953***
[2.909]
8.753***
[5.389]
-0.152***
[-9.179]
0.224
[0.669]
-0.001
[-0.506]
-0.016*
[-1.900]
0.596***
[4.714]
0.003
[0.593]
0.041***
[11.099]
0.004
[0.624]
0.004
[0.236]
0.008
[0.490]

Probit
(weak rights)

Tobit
(weak rights)

(3)
0.018***
[3.495]
0.015
[1.490]
-0.719**
[-2.098]
-0.075***
[-7.579]
0.095***
[19.927]
0.718*
[1.698]
7.795***
[8.175]
0.103***
[5.480]
0.140
[0.512]
-0.005***
[-2.907]
0.007
[0.723]
1.289***
[5.873]
-0.001
[-0.462]
0.046***
[11.688]
0.006
[0.665]
-0.068***
[-3.509]
0.021
[1.087]

(4)
0.015***
[3.658]
0.005
[0.741]
-0.331
[-1.403]
-0.068***
[-7.431]
0.029***
[8.877]
0.267
[0.795]
6.442***
[7.047]
-0.127***
[-7.482]
-0.156
[-0.827]
-0.001
[-0.445]
0.006
[0.522]
0.864***
[5.076]
-0.002
[-0.880]
0.033***
[8.658]
0.006
[0.885]
-0.049***
[-3.770]
0.021
[1.401]

Two-digit industry dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
0.158
0.018
0.162
0.018
Pseudo-R2
N
27,861
27,861
27,746
27,746
This table presents probit and tobit regression results based on two sub-groups determined by property
rights protection. The “strong rights” group comprises observations if the local property rights protection
index is higher than the sample median and the “weak rights” group includes observations if the local
property rights protection index is lower than the sample median. Marginal effects are reported.
Reported in parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered
at the city level to allow for cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included in all models but its coefficient is
unreported for brevity. A Wald test of the difference in the coefficient of Percent State Ownership
between groups (1) and (3) generates a Chi-square of 3.60 (p-value=0.058, d.f.=1, two-tailed). The
difference in the coefficient of Percent State Ownership between groups (2) and (4) generates a
Chi-square of 11.66 (p-value=0.001, d.f.=1, two-tailed). Therefore, the negative effect of state ownership
on corporate purchase of insurance is attenuated by the strong property right protection
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Table 5
Property rights security and the incidence & extent of insurance purchases (private firms)
Probit
Tobit
(1)
(2)
Property Rights Protection Index
0.151***
0.124***
[2.736]
[2.850]
Banking Sector Marketization
0.029***
0.018***
[4.378]
[3.751]
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges
0.031***
0.026***
[2.610]
[2.869]
Bank Corruption Index
0.018
0.198
[0.058]
[0.901]
Firm Size
0.094***
0.024***
[20.267]
[6.018]
R&D Intensity
1.227***
0.751***
[2.988]
[2.597]
Advertising Effort
7.123***
8.317***
[6.133]
[6.785]
Tangibility
0.105***
-0.147***
[5.131]
[-7.890]
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio
0.290
-0.165
[0.762]
[-0.540]
Quick Ratio
-0.009***
-0.003
[-4.490]
[-1.320]
Tax Credit Dummy
-0.009
0.002
[-0.921]
[0.185]
Debt Finance Dependence
1.399***
0.867***
[7.389]
[4.657]
Industrial Competition
-0.006
-0.005
[-1.536]
[-1.363]
Firm Age
0.057***
0.047***
[12.389]
[11.098]
Unemployment Rate
0.015**
0.009
[2.100]
[1.631]
GDP per Capita
-0.009
-0.016
[-0.457]
[-1.062]
Listing dummy
0.010
0.014
[0.377]
[0.651]
Two-digit industry dummies
yes
yes
2
0.152
0.018
Pseudo-R
N
26,097
26,097
Marginal effects are reported. Only privately-controlled firms (in which private ownership>50%) enter
the regression. Reported in parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors clustered at the city level to allow for cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, * denotes significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included in all models but its
coefficient is unreported for brevity.
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Table 6
Sub-group analysis by property rights protection (private firms)
Probit
Tobit
(strong
(strong
rights)
rights)
(1)
(2)
Banking Sector Marketization
0.041***
0.023***
[4.188]
[3.299]
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges
0.054***
0.054***
[2.834]
[4.068]
Bank Corruption Index
0.449
0.427
[0.993]
[1.514]
Firm Size
0.091***
0.016***
[12.471]
[2.888]
R&D Intensity
1.533**
0.733*
[2.215]
[1.666]
Advertising Effort
6.279***
10.028***
[3.178]
[4.395]
Tangibility
0.101***
-0.161***
[3.229]
[-6.340]
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio
0.395
0.019
[0.584]
[0.038]
Quick Ratio
-0.008***
-0.001
[-2.599]
[-0.518]
Tax Credit Dummy
-0.020
-0.005
[-1.523]
[-0.458]
Debt Finance Dependence
1.429***
0.809***
[6.229]
[3.816]
Industrial Competition
-0.004
-0.002
[-0.702]
[-0.371]
Firm Age
0.066***
0.054***
[10.375]
[10.130]
Unemployment Rate
0.019**
0.005
[2.137]
[0.638]
GDP per Capita
0.010
-0.013
[0.377]
[-0.637]
Listing dummy
-0.006
0.016
[-0.169]
[0.487]

Probit
(weak rights)

Tobit
(weak rights)

(3)
0.020***
[3.273]
0.003
[0.298]
-0.721**
[-2.134]
0.097***
[16.432]
0.948**
[2.500]
8.360***
[6.323]
0.106***
[4.118]
0.299
[0.654]
-0.009***
[-3.098]
0.004
[0.273]
1.351***
[4.528]
-0.007*
[-1.707]
0.050***
[9.004]
-0.001
[-0.139]
-0.053***
[-2.756]
0.029
[0.743]

(4)
0.015***
[2.700]
0
[0.040]
-0.292
[-0.986]
0.032***
[6.478]
0.732**
[2.319]
7.545***
[6.336]
-0.135***
[-5.389]
-0.159
[-0.383]
-0.003
[-1.011]
0.011
[0.749]
1.032***
[3.747]
-0.007*
[-1.702]
0.041***
[6.434]
0.002
[0.244]
-0.036**
[-2.129]
0.014
[0.452]

Two-digit industry dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
2
0.168
0.022
0.148
0.018
Pseudo-R
N
13,233
13,233
12,864
12,864
This table presents probit and tobit regression results based on two sub-groups determined by property
rights protection. Only privately-controlled firms (in which private ownership>50%) enter the regression.
The “strong rights” group comprises observations if the local property rights protection index is higher
than the sample median and the “weak rights” group includes observations if the local property rights
protection index is lower than the sample median. Marginal effects are reported. Reported in parentheses
are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the city level to allow
for cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included in all models but its coefficient is unreported for
brevity.
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Table 7
Sub-group analysis by listing status of private firms
Listed firms
Probit
Tobit
(1)
(2)
Property Rights Protection Index
-0.073
0.055
[-0.454]
[0.585]
Banking Sector Marketization
-0.010
-0.016
[-0.496]
[-1.371]
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges
0.081**
0.055***
[2.081]
[2.612]
Bank Corruption Index
-1.286*
-0.379
[-1.677]
[-0.930]
Firm Size
0.096***
-0.015
[6.053]
[-0.943]
R&D Intensity
2.053
1.614
[0.928]
[1.574]
Advertising Effort
15.404
11.832**
[1.563]
[2.306]
Tangibility
0.086
-0.205*
[0.612]
[-1.883]
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio
-4.032**
-2.502*
[-2.177]
[-1.919]
Quick Ratio
0.009
0.004
[0.587]
[0.345]
Tax Credit Dummy
0.001
-0.009
[0.014]
[-0.216]
Debt Finance Dependence
0.488
1.659**
[0.236]
[2.009]
Industrial Competition
0.012
0.008
[0.434]
[0.448]
Firm Age
0.083**
0.072***
[3.039]
[4.158]
Unemployment Rate
0.005
0.005
[0.261]
[0.455]
GDP per Capita
-0.018
0.033
[-0.346]
[0.994]

Unlisted firms
Probit
Tobit
(3)
(4)
0.154***
0.127***
[2.784]
[2.849]
0.030***
0.018***
[4.448]
[3.815]
0.030**
0.025***
[2.496]
[2.664]
0.048
0.220
[0.153]
[0.979]
0.094***
0.025***
[19.469]
[5.978]
1.232***
0.746**
[2.975]
[2.486]
7.035***
8.258***
[6.005]
[6.723]
0.105***
-0.146***
[5.188]
[-7.886]
0.490
-0.042
[1.269]
[-0.135]
-0.010***
-0.003
[-4.653]
[-1.410]
-0.010
0.002
[-0.938]
[0.165]
1.406***
0.855***
[7.314]
[4.622]
-0.006
-0.005
[-1.558]
[-1.389]
0.057***
0.047***
[12.124]
[10.782]
0.016**
0.009
[2.132]
[1.633]
-0.009
-0.016
[-0.450]
[-1.095]

Two-digit industry dummies
yes
yes
2
0.357
0.097
0.150
0.018
Pseudo-R
N
476
476
25,621
25,621
Marginal effects are reported. Only privately-controlled firms (in which private ownership>50%) enter
the regression. Reported in parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors clustered at the city level to allow for cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, * denotes significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included in all models but its
coefficient is unreported for brevity.
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Table 8
Panel A: Summary statistics of main variables used in cross-country analysis
Variables

Mean

Insurance Premium per Capita
(unlogged)
Insurance Premium per Capita
ROL of WB
ISSPR of EFN
COC of WB
FFC of HF
Bank Credit/GDP
Bank Concentration
GDP per Capita

336.061
4.588
0.418
6.283
0.452
51.844
0.572
0.640
12.854

Median

Std.Dev.

93.600
4.539
0.460
6.400
0.321
50.000
0.465
0.633
5.851

491.686
1.838
0.953
1.747
1.056
23.955
0.456
0.199
14.322

Min
0.600
-0.511
-1.719
1.400
-1.521
4.000
0.072
0.148
0.179

Max

N

4483.500
8.408
2.014
9.600
2.591
100.000
3.896
1.000
107.098

336.061
4.588
0.418
6.283
0.452
51.844
0.572
0.640
12.854

Panel B: Correlations among insurance and proxies for property rights protection
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

Insurance Premium per Capita
(1)
1.000
ROL of ICRG
(2)
0.810
1.000
ISSPR of EFN
(3)
0.772
0.902
1.000
COC of WB
(4)
0.823
0.950
0.895
1.000
FFC of HF
(5)
0.768
0.863
0.840
0.888
1.000
Note: a reliability test of the internal consistency produces a test scale for alpha value is 0.961
Panel C: 93 Countries included in the analysis (1995-2008)
Algeria
El Salvador
Luxembourg
Angola
Estonia
Malaysia
Argentina
Finland
Malta
Australia
France
Mauritius
Austria
Germany
Mexico
Bahamas
Greece
Morocco
Bangladesh
Guatemala
Namibia
Barbados
Hong Kong
Netherlands
Belgium
Hungary
New Zealand
Botswana
Iceland
Nigeria
Brazil
India
Norway
Bulgaria
Indonesia
Oman
Canada
Iran
Pakistan
Chile
Ireland
Panama
China
Israel
Peru
Colombia
Italy
Philippines
Costa Rica
Jamaica
Poland
Croatia
Japan
Portugal
Cyprus
Jordan
Qatar
Czech Rep.
Kenya
Romania
Denmark
Kuwait
Russia
Dominican Republic
Latvia
Saudi Arabia
Ecuador
Lebanon
Serbia & Montenegro
Egypt
Lithuania
Singapore
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Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Trinidad And Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zimbabwe

Table 9: Property rights security and the extent of insurance purchases (cross-country analysis)
(Dependent variable = ln(P/C Insurance Premium per Capita))
Panel A
ROL of the ICRG

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

FE

RE

FE

RE

FE

RE

FE

RE

0.309**
[2.620]

0.560***
[5.337]
0.087**
[2.486]

0.159***
[4.917]
0.253***
[3.026]

0.441***
[5.981]
0.061
[1.274]
-0.663***
[-2.959]
-0.007
[-0.053]
0.005
[1.322]

0.136***
[2.798]
-0.609***
[-2.709]
0.149
[1.097]
0.012**
[2.480]

ISSPR of EFN
COC of WB
Ln(FFC of HF)
Bank Concentration
Bank Credit/GDP
GDP per capita

-0.651***
[-2.922]
-0.026
[-0.162]
0.003
[0.829]

-0.639***
[-2.875]
0.027
[0.167]
0.007*
[1.706]

-0.440**
[-2.100]
-0.017
[-0.126]
0.005
[1.568]

-0.402*
[-1.935]
0.133
[1.031]
0.013***
[3.085]

-0.623***
[-2.915]
0.070
[0.422]
0.005
[1.257]

-0.588***
[-2.835]
0.186
[1.066]
0.010**
[2.327]

Year dummies
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
2
Overall adjusted-R
0.458
0.661
0.319
0.603
0.501
0.682
0.118
0.364
N
933
933
683
683
933
933
980
980
This table presents results from regressing P/C insurance consumption on property rights protection proxies. Reported in
parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level to allow for
cross-sectional correlation. “FE” means estimation from models with country fixed effects, “RE” means estimation from
models with country random effects. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed).
The intercept is included in all models but its coefficient is unreported for brevity. Ln(FFC of HF) is the natural log of FFC of
HF.

48

